《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第29节
But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realise the truth? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received--and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory?
注释摘要
这一段位于密尔论证的转折点上。他刚刚用很长的篇幅辨明，哪怕一个意见是全然正确的，如果它不被允许经受自由而激烈的驳难，它也会在信徒心中僵死为空洞的教条。顺着这个逻辑往下走，很容易引出一个令人生疑的推论：如此说来，难道人类智识的进步，反而要以一部分人永远错下去为代价？难道真理一旦获得全体一致的承认，就必然要在人们心里消亡？这个提问本身带着一种修辞上的不满，它隐…