《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第30节
I affirm no such thing. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion.
注释摘要
在这一段落中，密尔正在处理一个看来会动摇他前文论证的尖锐反问。他此前一直主张，自由讨论之所以不可或缺，是因为即使公认的意见是真理，若没有对立意见的碰撞，它也会在人们心中失去活生生的力量。于是自然有人要问：照此说来，难道真理必须永远伴随着反对者才不会消亡吗？人类智慧的进步，不正是在于不断消除争议、达成共识吗？若如此，难道进步的结果反而是真理的死亡？这悖论味十…