《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第28节
The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines--those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realised, until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who did understand it. The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A contemporary author has well spoken of "the deep slumber of a decided opinion."
注释摘要
这一段是密尔论证链条上向前推进的关键一步。在此之前，他已经分别处理了两种可能：我们要压制的意见可能是真理，压制它等于妄称自己绝对无误；即使它是错的，压制它也会使我们失去通过与错误碰撞而获得的对真理更清晰、更鲜活的领会。现在他进入第三种情形——即便公认的意见是真理，而且是完整的真理，如果没有讨论的磨砺，它依旧会死去。而他在这里要证明的，正是这个看似悖论的主张…