《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·二·论对赞扬的爱与对值得赞扬的爱》第7节
In such cases, the horror of blame-worthiness seems, even in persons who cannot be suspected of any extraordinary delicacy or sensibility of character, completely to conquer the dread of blame. In order to allay that horror, in order to pacify, in some degree, the remorse of their own consciences, they voluntarily submitted themselves both to the reproach and to the punishment which they knew were due to their crimes, but which, at the same time, they might easily have avoided.
注释摘要
在这里，斯密深化了他关于两种根本不同的恐惧的区分。此前他已经论证过，人不仅害怕实际遭受责备，更害怕自己成为那种理应被责备的存在。前者是害怕他人在现实中对我们发出的非难之声，后者则是内心意识到，自己的行为在道德上确确实实是憎恶与惩罚的恰当对象。这一段所处理的是这两种恐惧之间力量的悬殊：在某些极端的情形下，对后者的恐惧可以完全压倒对前者的恐惧。 他所设想的例子…