《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·二·论对赞扬的爱与对值得赞扬的爱》第5节

道德情操论 · 第29章 · 第5节

To desire, or even to accept of praise, where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible vanity. To desire it where it is really due is to desire no more than that a most essential act of justice should be done to us. The love of just fame, of true glory, even for its own sake, and independent of any advantage which he can derive from it, is not unworthy even of a wise man. He sometimes, however, neglects, and even despises it; and he is never more apt to do so than when he has the most perfect assurance of the perfect propriety of every part of his own conduct. His self-approbation, in this case, stands in need of no confirmation from the approbation of other men. It is alone sufficient, and he is contented with it. This self-approbation, if not the only, is at least the principal object, {106} about which he can or ought to be anxious. The love of it is the love of virtue.

注释摘要

斯密在这里将讨论推向一个更精微的层次。前面他刚建立起“值得赞扬”与“实际赞扬”的区分,此刻他要处理的是三种截然不同的姿态:渴求不应得的赞扬、渴求应得的赞扬,以及一个智慧之人对赞扬本身的那种疏离。他用的不是道德说教的口吻,而是心理观察者的笔法。 追求或接受不配得的赞扬,在他看来只可能出于最可鄙的虚荣。这不是因为他讨厌自信或自我欣赏,而是因为这种行为暴露了一种…