《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·三之一·论这种影响的原因》第5节
As what gives pleasure or pain, therefore, either in one way or another, is the sole exciting cause of gratitude and resentment; though the intentions of any person should be ever so proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever so improper and malevolent on the other; yet, if he has failed in producing either the good or the evil which he intended, as one of the exciting causes is wanting in both cases, less gratitude seems due to him in the one, and less resentment in the other. And, on the contrary, though in the intentions of any person, there was either no laudable degree of benevolence on the one hand, or no blamable degree of malice on the other; yet, if his actions should produce either great good or great evil, as one of the exciting causes takes place upon both these occasions, some gratitude is apt to arise towards him in the one, and some resentment in the other. A shadow of merit seems to fall upon him in the first, a shadow of demerit in the second. And, as the consequences of actions are altogether under the empire of Fortune, hence arises her influence upon the sentiments of mankind with regard to merit and demerit.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里做的是对他此前层层推进的分析进行收束。他试图解释，人们在判断一个行为是否值得感激或怨恨时，为什么并不完全按照行为者意图的好坏来裁决，而是会被实际产生的结果深度左右。这不是一段关于道德应当如何的训诫，而是对他观察到的道德心理的事实性描述。 他先确立了一个前提：快感与痛感的原因，是唯一能直接激发感激与怨恨的东西。这是从第一节一路延续下来的思路——…