《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·三之一·论这种影响的原因》第4节
The object, on the contrary, which resentment is chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in his turn, as to make him conscious that he feels it upon account of his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, and to make him sensible, that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner. What chiefly enrages us against the man who injures or insults us, is the little account which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he gives to himself above us, and that absurd self-love, by which he seems to imagine, that other people may be sacrificed at any time, to his conveniency or his humour. The glaring impropriety of his conduct, the gross insolence and injustice which it seems to involve in it, often shock and exasperate us more than all the mischief which we have suffered. To bring him back to a more just sense of what is due to other people, to make him sensible of what he owes us, and of the wrong that he has {88} done to us, is frequently the principal end proposed in our revenge, which is always imperfect when it cannot **accomplish this. When our enemy appears to have done us no injury, when we are sensible that he acted quite properly, that, in his situation, we should have done the same thing, and that we deserved from him all the mischief we met with; in that case, if we have the least spark either of candour or justice, we can entertain no sort of resentment. Before any thing, therefore, can be the complete and proper object, either of gratitude or resentment, it must possess three different qualifications. First, it must be the cause of pleasure in the one case, and of pain in the other. Secondly, it must be capable of feeling those sensations. And, thirdly, it must not only have produced those sensations, but it must have produced them from design, and from a design that is approved of in the one case, and disapproved of in the other. It is by the first qualification, that any object is capable of exciting those passions: it is by the second, that it is in any respect capable of gratifying them: the third qualification is not only necessary for their complete satisfaction, but as it gives a pleasure or pain that is both exquisite and peculiar, it is likewise an additional exciting cause of those passions.
注释摘要
斯密在这里做了一个对怨恨的剖析，其精细程度在十八世纪的道德哲学讨论中相当少见。他不是在描述人受了伤害之后那种原始的、火烧火燎的愤怒，他是在追问：这种愤怒彻底得到满足，究竟需要什么条件？他的回答会让人觉得有些反直觉，因为我们通常以为报复的目标就是让对方受罪，以牙还牙，痛苦扯平了事。但斯密说，不对，真正要紧的不是痛苦本身。 我们仔细看他给出的那个结构。怨恨所盯…