《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·一之五·功劳感与过失感的剖析》第3节
[Footnote 2: To ascribe in this manner our natural sense of the ill desert of human actions to a sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer, may seem, to the greater part of the people, to be a degradation of that sentiment. Resentment is commonly regarded as so odious a passion, that they will be apt to think it impossible that so laudable a principle, as the sense of the ill desert of vice, should in any respect be founded upon it. They will be more willing, perhaps, to admit that our sense of the merit of good actions is founded upon a sympathy with the gratitude of the persons who receive the benefit of them; because gratitude, as well as all the other benevolent passions, is regarded as an amiable principle, which can take nothing from the worth of whatever is founded upon it. Gratitude and resentment, however, are in every respect, it is evident, counterparts to one another; and if our sense of merit arises from a sympathy with the one, our sense of demerit can scarce miss to proceed from a fellow-feeling with the other.
注释摘要
这条长注是斯密为自己将过失感追溯到对受难者怨恨的同情这一做法所作的辩护，也是一次重要的理论澄清。他直接面对的是一个直觉上的困难：怨恨在大多数人眼里是一种可憎的情感，把对恶行的道德谴责建立在这种情感之上，似乎贬低了道德判断本身的品格。人们或许还能接受功劳感来自于对受益者感激的同情，因为感激属于仁慈一类的可爱情感，根基干净；但怨恨就不同了，它带着攻击性，带着报…