《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·一之四·前几章要点重述》第2节
But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the impropriety of the affection from whence it proceeds, when our heart rejects with {68} abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives of the agent, we then heartily and entirely sympathize with the resentment of the sufferer. Such actions seem then to deserve, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for, a proportionable punishment; and we entirely enter into, and thereby approve of, that resentment which prompts to inflict it. The offender necessarily seems then to be the proper object of punishment, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and thereby approve of, that sentiment which prompts to punish. In this case too, when we approve, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approve the action, and regard the person against whom it is directed, as its proper and suitable object.
注释摘要
斯密在这段文字里做的是一个非常精确的区分：单凭一个人对另一个人造成了伤害这一点，还不足以让旁观者完全认同受害者的怨恨。伤害是一个必要条件，但不是充分条件。充分条件在于，造成伤害的那个行为，必须出自某种我们不能认同的动机。只有当我们从心里拒绝与施害者的动机产生任何同感，甚至对之感到憎恶时，我们才会全心全意地进入受害者的怨恨之中。 这里的关键概念仍然是symp…