《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第8节
Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being "pushed to an extreme;" not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility, when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.
注释摘要
这一段出现在密尔完成关于压制言论等于假设自己无误这一核心论证之后，正在处理一种常见的退让性反驳。这种反驳大致是：我们承认自由讨论的一般原则是有道理的，但不应该把它推到极端；有些信念是如此确定无疑，以至于对其加以质疑根本就不应该被允许。密尔要做的，就是揭穿这种立场的逻辑破绽。在论证链条上，这是对“假设无误”论点的进一步巩固和延伸，把那种试图在原则上让步、在应…