《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第7节
It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonisation of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a "devil's advocate." The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do. The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.
注释摘要
这段论证承接上文关于人类判断力之可错性与可修正性的讨论，密尔在此处把他对个人认知方式的剖析，转为一个要求公众也必须遵守的认识论规则。他要证明的是，如果连最明智、最有理由信任自己判断的人，都需要通过与反对意见的不断遭遇来为信念奠定基础，那么由少数聪明人和多数愚蠢人混杂而成的“公众”，就更没有理由跳过这一过程。密尔在这里运用的是一个类比推理：把个体的认知规范提…