《论自由·第一章·导论》第10节
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.
注释摘要
这一段密尔在为他刚刚宣布的自由原则划定边界。前面他提出了那个著名的伤害原则，也就是社会强制个体的唯一正当理由就是防止对他人的伤害。现在他要处理一个必然会被追问的逻辑前提，即这个原则究竟对谁适用。他的论证策略是做一个排除，把两个范畴明确地划出去，儿童和心智未成熟者，以及处于落后状态的社会。这个排除在论证链条里起到的作用，是防止原则的泛化而导致的荒谬后果，就好…