《论自由·第一章·导论》第9节
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
注释摘要
我们来到了《论自由》第一章中最核心、也是最常被引用的段落。在全书的论证链条中，密尔在追溯了自由与权威斗争的历史，并指出“多数人的暴政”这一新的威胁后，在此处正式提出了他整篇论文所要捍卫的那个“非常简单的原则”。这段话是全书的总纲领，他接下来所有关于思想自由、个性与行动自由的讨论，都是对这一原则的展开和运用。 密尔要证明的是，社会对个人进行强制或控制的权力，…