《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第25节
[Kant's note] Let it not be thought that the common "quod tibi non vis fieri, etc." could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is only a deduction from the former, though with several limitations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on. Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end. Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end which all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if every one does not also endeavour, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to have its full effect with me.
注释摘要
康德在这里特意插入一条注释，是为了澄清一个极易产生的误解。读者看到他提出的实践命令——要把人性永远当作目的，不能仅仅当作手段——很可能会自然地联想起一句流传久远的道德格言："己所不欲，勿施于人。"但康德明确指出，这句格言绝不能混同于他所说的道德最高原则，它充其量只能算是一个附带诸多限制的推论，本身并不具备成为普遍法则的资格。这一论断不是随便一提，而是紧扣着…