《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第24节

道德形而上学基础 · 第3章 · 第24节

[Kant's note] This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The ground of it will be found in the concluding section. To abide by the previous examples: Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.) Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.

注释摘要

这段文字是康德自己加在正文旁边的一条长注,紧接在他提出第二条绝对命令的公式之后。这条公式说,你要这样行动,永远把你人格中的人性以及每一个他人人格中的人性,同时当作目的,绝不仅仅当作手段来使用。这句话在全书里第一次把“人(理性存在者)是目的自身”确立为最高的实践原则,康德却在这里加了一句很老实的交代:这个主张眼下只当作一个公设摆在这里,它的根据要到最后一节才…