《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第12节
Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible? This question does not seek to know how we can conceive the accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains, but merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the imperative expresses. No special explanation is needed to show how an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto. This proposition is, as regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as my effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an acting cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the imperative educes from the conception of volition of an end the conception of actions necessary to this end. Synthetical propositions must no doubt be employed in defining the means to a proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act of the will, but the object and its realization. E.g., that in order to bisect a line on an unerring principle I must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions; but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended operation can be performed, then to say that, if I fully will the operation, I also will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself as acting in this way.
注释摘要
康德在这里突然停住，问了一个看起来很技术性的问题：诸种命令式究竟是怎么可能的？他立刻做了一个关键的澄清——他问的不是我们怎么才能完成命令式所要求的那种行动，而是我们怎么才能设想命令式对意志施加的那种必然性，那种“应当”。这是两个完全不同的问题。前者问的是技术上的可行性，后者问的是理性为什么有资格对意志发号施令。 先从最简单的入手，也就是技艺的命令式。康德的…