《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第11节
There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these three sorts of principles in the dissimilarity of the obligation of the will. In order to mark this difference more clearly, I think they would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands (laws) of morality. For it is law only that involves the conception of an unconditional and objective necessity, which is consequently universally valid; and commands are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposition to inclination. Counsels, indeed, involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a contingent subjective condition, viz., they depend on whether this or that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness; the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be quite properly called a command. We might also call the first kind of imperatives technical (belonging to art), the second pragmatic (to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to morals). [Kant's note] It seems to me that the proper signification of the word pragmatic may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanctions are called pragmatic which flow properly not from the law of the states as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches prudence, i.e., instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better, or at least as well as, the men of former time.
注释摘要
康德在这里要证明的是：意志所服从的那些原则并不都是同一类东西，它们对意志构成约束的方式截然不同，而这种差异恰恰是厘清道德本质的关键一步。他从前文对假言命令与绝对命令的区分出发，现在进一步把命令的三种形态确定下来，并着重说明，只有最后一种才配得上“律法”这个名称。这一步论证的推进逻辑是：既然命令表达了客观理性法则对一个并不必然依之而行的意志的关系，那么根据命…