《道德原则研究·附录四·论若干语词之争》第1节
Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous and endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object of our present enquiry; and proposed simply to collect, on the one hand, a list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem, and form a part of personal merit; and on the other hand, a catalogue of those qualities which are the object of censure or reproach, and which detract from the character of the person possessed of them; subjoining some reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or blame. On all occasions, where there might arise the least hesitation, I avoided the terms Virtue and Vice; because some of those qualities, which I classed among the objects of praise, receive, in the English language, the appellation of talents, rather than of virtues; as some of the blameable or censurable qualities are often called defects, rather than vices. It may now, perhaps, be expected that before we conclude this moral enquiry, we should exactly separate the one from the other; should mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and defects; and should explain the reason and origin of that distinction. But in order to excuse myself from this undertaking, which would, at last, prove only a grammatical enquiry, I shall subjoin the four following reflections, which shall contain all that I intend to say on the present subject.
注释摘要
休谟一上来就划了一条很锋利的界线：哲学家常常在做语法学家的事而不自知。他们以为自己在争辩最深刻、最要紧的问题，其实不过是在争辩词语的用法。整个附录四的起点就是这个观察——一种对哲学行当自身的警惕。他不是在嘲笑咬文嚼字，而是在指出一个方法论上的混淆：把语词边界的划定当成了对事物本身的研究。 他接着说明，正是为了避开这种无谓的语词争执，他在这本书里刻意做了一件…