《道德原则研究·附录三·关于正义的若干补论》第7节

道德原则研究 · 第13章 · 第7节

We may just observe, before we conclude this subject, that after the laws of justice are fixed by views of general utility, the injury, the hardship, the harm, which result to any individual from a violation of them, enter very much into consideration, and are a great source of that universal blame which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of society, this coat, this horse is mine, and ought to remain perpetually in my possession: I reckon on the secure enjoyment of it: by depriving me of it, you disappoint my expectations, and doubly displease me, and offend every bystander. It is a public wrong, so far as the rules of equity are violated: it is a private harm, so far as an individual is injured. And though the second consideration could have no place, were not the former previously established: for otherwise the distinction of mine and thine would be unknown in society: yet there is no question but the regard to general good is much enforced by the respect to particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual, is often more lightly thought of. But where the greatest public wrong is also conjoined with a considerable private one, no wonder the highest disapprobation attends so iniquitous a behaviour.

注释摘要

这一段落在附录三里承担的是一个收束性的工作:休谟在前面已经论证了,正义的规则从公共效用中产生,并且正义不同于人道之处,在于它必须依靠全社会共同维持的一整套行为体系才有意义。现在他要处理一个容易被忽略的问题:规则一旦以公共效用为根据建立起来以后,违反规则给个体造成的那个切近的伤害,在道德反应里究竟扮演什么角色。他的回答是:这种个体层面的损害是普遍谴责的一个重…