《道德原则研究·附录一·论道德感》第9节
Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of Reason and of Taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, without addition and diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown: after all circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: the standard of the other arising from the eternal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence.
注释摘要
这段话是休谟在《附录一》结尾处对整场辩论所做的收束。他在这里要完成的工作不是再提出新论证，而是把前面全部讨论结晶为一幅分工图：理性与趣味各司何职，各自的标准从何而来，它们如何共同构成一个完整的道德判断。 他先说，理性传递的是真与伪的知识，这个职能很明确——它发现事物在自然中本来的样子，不加不减。趣味则不然。它有一种“生产性的能力”（productive f…