《道德原则研究·附录一·论道德感》第8节
V. It appears evident that--the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependance on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man Why He uses exercise; he will answer, because He desires To keep His health. If you then enquire, Why He desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness Is painful. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason Why He hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. Perhaps to your second question, Why He desires health, he may also reply, that It Is necessary For The exercise Of His calling. If you ask, Why He Is anxious On That head, he will answer, because He desires To get money. If you demand Why? It Is The instrument Of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress In INFINITUM; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection. Now as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee and reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys; it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you may please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.
注释摘要
这是第五项也是最后一项考虑，休谟要在这里完成论证的最后一击：将道德判断最终锚定在人类情感之上，而理性只能充当手段与后果的侦查员。他的策略不再从具体德性或罪行出发，而是转向人类行动的一般结构——追问「为什么」能追问到哪里为止。 他设定了一个任何人都可以检验的日常场景。一个人说他在锻炼，问他为什么，他说为了保持健康；再问为什么想要健康，他说生病很痛苦；再追问为…