《道德情操论·卷四·论效用对赞同感的作用·二·论效用的外观赋予品格与行为的美》第3节
With regard to the first of those qualities, it has been observed on a former occasion, that superior reason and understanding are originally approved of as just and right and accurate, and not merely as useful or advantageous. It is in the abstruser sciences, particularly in the higher parts of mathematics, that the greatest and most admired exertions of human reason have been displayed. But the utility of those sciences, either to the individual or to the public, is not very obvious, and to prove it, requires a discussion which is not always very easily comprehended. It was not, therefore, their utility which first recommended them to the public admiration. This quality was but little insisted upon, till it became necessary to make some reply to the reproaches of those, who, having themselves no taste for such sublime discoveries, endeavoured to depreciate them as useless. That self-command, in the same manner, by which we restrain our present appetites, in order to gratify them more fully upon another occasion, is approved of, as much under the aspect of propriety, as under that of utility. When we act in this manner, the sentiments which influence our conduct seem exactly to coincide with those of the spectator. The spectator, however, does not feel the solicitations of our present appetites.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里要回应的，是一个来自于他那位“巧妙而令人愉快的作者”的重大命题。他说的人当然就是休谟。休谟认为，我们之所以赞同德性，归根到底是因为我们察觉到了它所带来的效用，也就是一种由有用性而产生的美。斯密并不完全否认效用会增强我们的赞同，但他坚持说，效用并不是赞同最初的、首要的来源。而这一段要做的，就是为他这一观点提供两个具体的论证。 他先讨论的是被前人…