《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·六·何种情形下责任感应是行为的唯一原则》第8节
The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and indispensable. The other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it. A man may learn to write grammatically by rule, with the most absolute infallibility; and so, perhaps, he may be taught to act justly. But there are no rules whose observance will infallibly lead us to the attainment of elegance or sublimity in writing; though there are some which may help us, in some measure, to correct, and ascertain the vague ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those perfections. And there are no rules by the knowledge of which we can infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions with {156} prudence, with just magnanimity, or proper beneficence: though there are some which may enable us to correct and ascertain, in several respects, the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those virtues--the rules of justice.
注释摘要
斯密在全文论证的核心问题是，人的行为在什么情形之下应当主要或完全出自责任感，又在什么情形下应当容许其他情感参与并发挥主导作用。他分两个标准来讨论：一是感情本身是自然令人愉悦还是令人反感；二是道德规则本身的精确程度。这段话落在第二个标准上，而且是他对这第二个标准所做的最集中、也最为后世学者重视的一次对比说明。 他所做的比较，是把全部德行分成两类。一类以正义为…