《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·六·何种情形下责任感应是行为的唯一原则》第3节
The contrary maxim takes place with regard to the malevolent and unsocial passions. We ought to reward from the gratitude and generosity of our own hearts, without any reluctance, and without being obliged to reflect how great the propriety of rewarding: but we ought always to punish with reluctance, and more from a sense of the propriety of punishing, than from any savage disposition to revenge. Nothing is more graceful than the behaviour of the man who appears to resent the greatest injuries, more from a sense that they deserve, and are the proper objects of resentment, than from feeling himself the furies of that disagreeable passion; who, like a judge, considers only the general rule, which determines what vengeance is due for each particular offence; who, in executing that rule, feels less for what himself has suffered, than for what the offender is about to suffer; who, though in wrath, does ever remember mercy, and is disposed to interpret the rule in the most gentle and favourable manner, and to allow all the alleviations which the most candid humanity could, consistently with good sense, admit of.
注释摘要
斯密在前文提出了一个核心问题：我们的行为在什么情况下应当主要或完全出自责任感，又在什么情况下应当有其他情感参与并主导。他刚刚处理了仁爱与社会性情感的那一面，结论是这类美好行为最好是由情感本身驱动，责任感只应扮演节制的角色。现在他调转方向，开始讨论恶意与非社会性的情感，所给出的准则恰好相反。 这里的关键在于合宜感的来源不同。在仁爱情感那里，旁观者天然乐于与行…