《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·四·论自欺的性质与一般准则的起源和用处》第5节
An amiable action, a respectable action, an horrid action, are all of them actions which naturally excite for the person who performs them, the love, the respect, or the horror of the spectator. The general rules which determine what actions are, and what are not, the objects of each of those sentiments, can be formed no other way than by observing what actions actually and in fact excite them. When these general rules, indeed, have been formed, when they are universally acknowledged and established, by the concurring sentiments of mankind, we frequently appeal to them as to the standards of judgment, in debating concerning the degree of praise or blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature. They are upon these occasions commonly cited as the ultimate foundations of what is just and unjust in human conduct; and this circumstance seems to have misled several very eminent authors, to draw up their systems in such a manner, as if they had supposed that the original judgments of mankind with regard to right and wrong, were formed like the decisions of a court of judicatory, by considering first the general rule, and then, secondly, whether the particular action under consideration fell properly within its comprehension.
注释摘要
在这一段里，斯密处理的是一个极易被颠倒的顺序问题。一般人谈起道德，总觉得是先有原则、后有对具体行为的判断，仿佛我们心里存着一套现成的道德法则，遇到事情就拿出来比对。斯密恰恰要把这个关系翻转过来。他说，一般规则不是判断的前提，而是判断的结果。 他的论证起点很简单：可爱的、可敬的、可怖的行为，分别会自然地激起旁观者的爱、尊重或恐惧。这里的三个形容词对应着三种截…