《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·四·论自欺的性质与一般准则的起源和用处》第1节
IN order to pervert the rectitude of our own judgments concerning the propriety of our own conduct, it is not always necessary that the real and impartial spectator should be at a great distance. When he is at hand, when he is present, the violence and injustice of our own selfish passions are sometimes sufficient to induce the man within the breast to make a report very different from what the real circumstances of the case are capable of authorising. There are two different occasions upon which we examine our own conduct, and endeavour to view it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it: first, when we are about to act; and secondly, after we have acted. Our views are apt to be very partial in both cases; but they are apt to be most partial when it is of most importance that they should be otherwise. When we are about to act, the eagerness of passion will seldom allow us to consider what we are doing, with the candour of an indifferent person. The violent emotions which at that time agitate us, discolour our views of things, even when we are endeavouring to place ourselves {138} in the situation of another, and to regard the objects that interest us in the light in which they will naturally appear to him. The fury of our own passions constantly calls us back to our own place, where every thing appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love. Of the manner in which those objects would appear to another, of the view which he would take of them, we can obtain, if I may say so, but instantaneous glimpses, which vanish in a moment, and which, even while they last, are not altogether just. We cannot even for that moment divest ourselves entirely of the heat and keenness with which our peculiar situation inspires us, nor consider what we are about to do with the complete impartiality of an equitable judge. The passions, upon this account, as Father Malebranche says, all justify themselves, and seem reasonable and proportioned to their objects, as long as we continue to feel them.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里直接面对一个困境：即使我们内心那个想象的旁观者就在眼前，人的自利激情依然有足够的力量扭曲它的判断。这等于承认了他整个道德心理学的核心机制——用设身处地的想象来约束自爱——在实践上存在着一个深层的运行障碍。这里值得注意的是，斯密把“真实的、不偏不倚的旁观者”与“胸中之人”作了一个微妙的区分：前者是我们以想象构造的那个审视自己的第三者，后者是那个…