《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·三·论良心的影响与权威》第2节
In the same manner, to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much more passionate joy or {119} sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatest concern of another with, whom we have no particular connexion. His interests, as long as they are surveyed from this station, can never be put into the balance with our own, can never restrain us from doing whatever may tend to promote our own, how ruinous so ever to him. Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality between us. Here, too, habit and experience have taught us to do this so easily and so readily, that we are scarce sensible that we do it; and it requires, in this case too, some degree of reflection, and even of philosophy, to convince us, how little interest we should take in the greatest concerns of our neighbour, how little we should be affected by whatever relates to him, if the sense of propriety and justice did not correct the otherwise natural inequality of our sentiments.
注释摘要
斯密在这里处理的是一个根本性的道德难题：人天生从自己的位置往外看，视角是锁死的，自己的蝇头小利比别人的滔天大祸看起来还要大。他上一段刚用视觉作过类比——窗外的大片风景在肉眼看来比房间还小，除非你靠想象把自己移到远处，换个站的位置，才能判断出它们真实的尺寸比例。现在他把这个逻辑搬到了人的道德判断上。 这一节的论证可以分两层来读。第一层是在描述人类激情的原始倾…