《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·二·论对赞扬的爱与对值得赞扬的爱》第11节
The agreement or disagreement both of the sentiments and judgments of other people with our own, is, in all cases, it must be observed, of more or less importance to us, exactly in proportion as we ourselves are more or less uncertain about the propriety of our own sentiments, about the accuracy of our own judgments. A man of sensibility may sometimes feel great uneasiness lest he should have yielded too much even to what may be called an honourable passion; to his just indignation, perhaps, at the injury which may have been done either to himself or to his friend. He is anxiously afraid lest, meaning only to act with spirit, and to do justice, he may, from the too great vehemence of his emotion, have done a real injury to some other person; who, though not innocent, may not have been altogether so guilty as he at first apprehended. The opinion of other people becomes, in this case, of the utmost importance to him. Their approbation is the most healing balsam; their disapprobation, the bitterest and most tormenting poison that can be poured into his uneasy mind. When he is perfectly satisfied with every part of his own conduct, the judgment of other people is often of less importance to him. {111} There are some very noble and beautiful arts, in which the degree of excellence can be determined only by a certain nicety of taste, of which the decisions, however, appear always, in some measure, uncertain. There are others, in which the success admits, either of clear demonstration, or very satisfactory proof. Among the candidates for excellence in those different arts, the anxiety about the public opinion is always much greater in the former than in the latter.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里把讨论推向了一个更精细的层面。此前他已经把对赞扬的渴望与对值得赞扬的渴望区分开来，现在他追问的是：我们为什么有时对外界的评判格外在意，有时却几乎无动于衷？他的回答是，这取决于我们对自己判断的确信程度。我们的自我评价越是不确定，他人与我们的看法是否一致，就越是牵动我们的情绪。这是一个相当冷静的心理学观察，却被他铺垫得很自然。 他所举的第一个例子…