《道德情操论·卷三·论评判自己情感与行为的基础·一·论自我赞同与自我否定的原理》第4节
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of. But that the {102} judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the effect. To be amiable and to be meritorious; that is, to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue; and to be odious and punishable, of vice. But all these characters have an immediate reference to the sentiments of others. Virtue is not said to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own gratitude; but because it excites those sentiments in other men. The consciousness that it is the object of such favourable regards, is the source of that inward tranquillity and self-satisfaction with which it is naturally attended, as the suspicion of the contrary gives occasion to the torments of vice. What so great happiness as to be beloved, and to know that we deserve to be beloved? What so great misery as to be hated, and to know that we deserve to be hated?
注释摘要
在这段文字里，斯密把他整个自我评判理论中最具结构性的一个动作说清楚了：人每当审视自己的行为并试图下判断时，必然会在内心将自己一分为二。一个是审判者，一个是受审者。审判者的身份不是随便臆想出来的，而是斯密反复打磨过的那个想象性机制——我把自己放在一个旁观者的位置上，用他的眼光、从他的立足点来看我自己的举动与动机。这个旁观者的感受，就是我努力进入并体验的东西。…