《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·三之二·论这种影响的限度》第7节
But though in general we are averse to enter into the unsocial and malevolent affections, though we lay it down for a rule that we ought never to approve of their gratification, unless so far as the malicious and unjust intention of the person, against whom they are directed, renders him their proper object; yet, upon some occasions, we relax of this severity. When the negligence of one man has occasioned some unintended damage to another, we generally enter so far into the resentment of the sufferer, as to approve of his inflicting a punishment upon the offender much beyond what the offence would have appeared to deserve, had no such unlucky consequence followed from it.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里触及了一个他精心设置的例外情境。全书大部分篇幅都在讲述一个规则：我们天然不情愿去分享那些反社会的、带恶意的情感，比如愤怒和报复的冲动。这一类情感要获得赞同，门槛很高，通常只有在对方确实怀有恶意且行不义之举时，旁观者才会认为被冒犯者的愤怒是正当的。斯密在这里说的“除非那个被针对的人本身就带有恶意和不义的意图，因而成为合适的对象”，正是这个一贯立…