《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·三·总论命运对人们情感的影响》第1节
INTRODUCTION.--Whatever praise or blame can be due to any action, must belong either, first, to the intention or affection of the heart, from which it proceeds, or, secondly, to the external action or movement of the body, which this affection gives occasion to; or, lastly, to the good or bad consequences, which actually, and in fact, proceed from it. These three different things constitute the whole nature and circumstances of the action, and must be the foundation of whatever quality can belong to it. That the two last of these three circumstances cannot be the foundation of any praise or blame, is abundantly evident; nor has the contrary ever been asserted by any body. The external action or movement of the body is often the same in the most innocent and in the most blamable actions. He who shoots a bird, and he who shoots a man, both of them perform the same external movement: each of them draws the trigger of a gun. The consequences which actually, and in fact, happen to proceed from any action, are, if possible, still more indifferent either to praise or blame, than even the external movement of the body. As they depend, not upon the agent, but upon fortune, they cannot be {85} the proper foundation for any sentiment, of which his character and conduct are the objects. The only consequences for which he can be answerable, or by which he can deserve either approbation or disapprobation of any kind, are those which were some way or other intended, or those which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the intention of the heart, from which he acted. To the intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design, all praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind, which can justly be bestowed upon any action must ultimately belong. When this maxim is thus proposed, in abstract and general terms, there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its self-evident justice is acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a dissenting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how different soever the accidental, the unintended and unforeseen consequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or affections from which they arose were, on the one hand, equally proper and equally beneficent, or, on the other, equally improper and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of the actions is still the same, and the agent is equally the suitable object either of gratitude or of resentment.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里做了一件在他看来十分必要的事：先把一个几乎人人都会点头称许的原则摆出来，再立刻指出，我们在生活里其实从来不曾真正遵守过它。这就是他为接下来整整一章的分析所打下的地基。他不是在宣布一条道德规则，而是在描述一个让我们集体陷入窘境的事实——我们嘴上同意一套标准，情感上却执行着另一套。 他从一个看似平淡的分类入手。任何一个行为，可以拿来称赞或责备的根…