《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·一之五·功劳感与过失感的剖析》第7节

道德情操论 · 第20章 · 第7节

Before I conclude this note, I must take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the sentiments of any person as proper and suitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the same manner as he is, but we must perceive this harmony and correspondence of sentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though upon hearing of a misfortune that had befallen my friend, I should conceive precisely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be said to approve of the sentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we should entirely sympathize with the person who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord between his sentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been bestowed upon another person, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he pleases, if, by bringing his case home to myself, I feel gratitude arise in my own breast, I necessarily approve of the conduct of his benefactor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the person who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our sentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correspondence of sentiments, therefore, is here required. It is sufficient that if he was grateful, they would correspond; and our sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illusive sympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the case of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a similar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.]

注释摘要

斯密在这一长注的收束处做了一个极其重要的区分,而这个区分常常被急于进入正文的读者忽略。他在这里要澄清的是:我们赞同一种行为是合宜的,与我们赞同一种行为是有功劳的,这两种赞同在心理机制上并不相同。前者需要一种实际发生的情感对应,后者则不需要。 他先讲对合宜的赞同。假如我听说一位朋友遭遇不幸,我可能恰好想象出与他完全相同的关切程度。但仅凭这一点,我还不能说他表…