《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·一之三·不赞同施惠者的动机，则无从同情受惠者的感激》第3节
2. Secondly, I say, That wherever the conduct of the agent appears to have been entirely directed by motives and affections which we thoroughly enter into and approve of, we can have no sort of sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer, how great soever the mischief which may have been done to him. When two people quarrel, if we take part with, and entirely adopt the resentment of one of them, it is impossible that we should enter into that of the other. Our sympathy with the person whose motives we go along with, and whom therefore we look upon as in the right, cannot but harden us against all fellow-feeling with the other, whom we necessarily regard as in the wrong. Whatever this last, therefore, may have suffered, while it is no more than what we ourselves should have wished him to suffer, while it is no more than what our own sympathetic indignation would have prompted us to inflict upon him, it cannot either displease or provoke us. When an inhuman murderer is brought to the scaffold, though we have some compassion for his misery, we can have no sort of fellow-feeling with his resentment, if he should be so absurd as to express any against either his prosecutor or his judge. The natural tendency of their just indignation against so vile a criminal is indeed the most fatal and {67} ruinous to him. But it is impossible that we should be displeased with the tendency of a sentiment, which, when we bring the case home to ourselves, we feel that we cannot avoid adopting.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里处理的是前一节论证的背面。前面他说，如果施惠者的动机不合宜，我们就很难同情受惠者的感激。这里他把镜头转向伤害行为：当施害者的动机完全合宜、完全是我们能够进入并赞同的情感时，受害者的怨恨就再也无法引起我们的共鸣——不管他所受的伤害有多沉重。 论证的起点是一个严格的条件句。斯密说，只要行为者的行动完全由那些我们能彻底进入并赞同的动机与情感所支配，…