《道德情操论·卷二·论功劳与过失·一之三·不赞同施惠者的动机，则无从同情受惠者的感激》第1节
IT is to be observed, however, that, how beneficial soever on the one hand, or hurtful soever on the other, the actions or intentions of the person who acts may have been to the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon, yet if in the one case there appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the agent, if we cannot enter into the affections which influenced his conduct, we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the person who receives the benefit: or if, in the other case, there appears to have been no impropriety in the motives of the agent, if, on the contrary, the affections which influenced his conduct are such as we must necessarily enter into, we can have no sort of sympathy with the resentment of the person who suffers. Little gratitude seems due in the one case, and all sort of resentment seems unjust in the other. The one action seems to merit little reward, the other to deserve no punishment.
注释摘要
斯密在这一段里推进了一个看似悖反却极关键的论点：一个行为的功过，不只取决于它对承受者造成的实际损益，还根本性地取决于旁观者能否进入施动者的动机。损益是可见的结果，但功劳与过失是旁观者心中对整出情境的完整反应——这个反应必须先通过施动者的情感之门，才会流向承受者的感激或怨恨。 他先处理施惠这一侧。即便行为带来巨大好处，只要我们无法同情施动者当时驱动其行为的情…