《道德情操论·卷一·论行为的合宜性·二之五·论自私的情感》第2节
Mankind, however, more readily sympathize with those smaller joys which flow from less important causes. It is decent to be humble amidst great prosperity; but we can scarce express too much satisfaction in all the little occurrences of common life, in the company with which we spent the evening last night, in the entertainment that was set before us, in what was said and what was done, in all the little incidents of the present conversation, and in all those frivolous nothings which fill up the void of human life. Nothing is more graceful than habitual cheerfulness, which is always founded upon a peculiar relish for all the little pleasures which common occurrences afford. We readily sympathize with it: it inspires us with the same joy, and makes every trifle turn up to us in the same agreeable aspect in which it presents itself to the person endowed with this happy disposition. Hence it is that youth, the season of gaiety, so easily engages our affections. That propensity to joy which seems even to animate the bloom, and to sparkle from the eyes of youth and beauty, though in a person of the same sex, exalts, even the aged, to a more joyous mood than ordinary. They forget, for a time, their infirmities, and abandon themselves to those agreeable ideas and emotions to which they have long been strangers, but which, when the presence of so much happiness recalls them to their breast, take their place there, like old acquaintance, from whom they are sorry to have ever been parted, and whom they embrace more heartily upon account of this long separation.
注释摘要
这一段承接的是对自私情感同情机制的一个特殊不对称性的观察。亚当·斯密发现，人们在同情他人的喜悦与悲伤时，遵循的不是对等的逻辑，而是一种关于尺度的直觉判断：极小的喜悦，远比巨大的喜悦更容易获得旁观者的同情；而极小的苦恼，则几乎永远招不来同情，反倒容易成为笑谈。 这个论点的论证起点，在于喜悦这种情感本身的特质。喜悦是一种愉快的情感，只要不受嫉妒的阻碍，我们天然…