《道德情操论·卷一·论行为的合宜性·一之三·我们如何判断他人情感是否合宜》第4节
Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly the tendency of affections, and have given little attention to the relation which they stand in to the cause which excites them. In common life, however, when we judge of any person's conduct, and of the sentiments which directed it, we constantly consider them under both these aspects. When we blame in another man the excesses of love, of grief, of resentment, we not only consider the ruinous effect which they tend to produce, but the little occasion which was given for them. The merit of his favourite, we say, is not so great, his misfortune is not so dreadful, his provocation is not so extraordinary, as to justify so violent a passion. We should have indulged, we say, perhaps, have approved of the violence of his emotion, had the cause been in any respect proportioned to it. When we judge in this manner of any affection as proportioned or disproportioned to the cause which excites it, it is scarce possible that we should make use of any other rule or canon but the correspondent affection in ourselves. If, upon bringing the case home to our own breast, we find that the sentiments which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with our own, we necessarily approve of them as proportioned and suitable to their objects; if otherwise, we necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion. Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them. {19}
注释摘要
这一小段实际上是在做一个重要的哲学声明，斯密在这里把自己与当时的主流道德哲学立场明确区分开来。近世的哲学家，他指的首先是哈奇森，也包括休谟，他们主要考察的是情感的倾向，也就是一种情感会把人引向什么样的行为后果。情感如果趋向有益的后果，就被认为是善的；趋向有害的后果，就被认为是恶的。整套判断的逻辑是后果导向的。但斯密认为这仅仅抓住了事情的一半。在日常生活里，…