《道德情操论·卷一·论行为的合宜性·一之二·论相互同情的愉快》第1节
BUT whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary. Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account, according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain. Man, say they, conscious of his own weakness, and of the need which he has for the assistance of others, rejoices whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he is then assured of that assistance; and {14} grieves whenever he observes the contrary, because he is then assured of their opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are always felt so instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions, that it seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such self-interested consideration. A man is mortified when, after having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round and sees that nobody laughs at his jests but himself. On the contrary, the mirth of the company is highly agreeable to him, and he regards this correspondence of their sentiments with his own as the greatest applause.
注释摘要
斯密在这一节里要反驳一个对手：那种认为人的一切情绪都可以归结为自爱之精致变形的理论。按那个对手的说法，我们之所以因同伴认同我们的情感而喜，是因为那许给我们会得到帮助；之所以因对方无动于衷而悲，是因为那预告我们将遭到反对。斯密没有否认人需要帮助，但他指出，这种愉快和痛苦往往来得极快，又发生在极琐屑的场合，根本不像经过一番计算。他举的例子是，一个人想逗众人发笑…