《君主论·第二十四章·意大利君主为何丧失邦国》第1节
The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom. And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
注释摘要
马基雅维利在这一段开篇做了一个大胆的翻转：一个新登位的君主，如果谨慎遵循前文所述的各种统治术，不仅能迅速站稳脚跟，甚至可能比那些坐了多年江山的世袭君主更加稳固。这个判断从表面看违背常识，毕竟世袭君主有血统正当性，有惯性的臣服可以用。但他的推理链条很清楚：正因为新君主的地位不被视为理所当然，人们反而会用审慎甚至是挑剔的眼光打量他的一言一行。一旦他的行动展现出…