《君主论·第二十二章·君主的大臣》第2节
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.
注释摘要
这一节马基雅维利讨论的是君主与大臣之间极为脆弱又极为关键的依赖关系，论证的核心是：君主如何判断手下是否可用，以及君主自己应当怎样主动塑造这种关系，使其不至腐坏。 他在这里并没有引入博尔贾或塞维鲁那样的戏剧性故事，而是直接从一条看似常识、但切中要害的检验标准说起：一个大臣若在任何事务上都首先盘算自己的利益，而不是君主的利益，此人便绝对不可用，也无法被信任。理…