《君主论·第二十一章·君主如何博得尊崇》第4节
In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the parties.
注释摘要
这一段的逻辑承接上文关于中立与公开表态的讨论，并进入了一个更细致的情形：当交战双方无论谁获胜，都不会立刻直接威胁你的安全时，君主应当如何处理。马基雅维利坚持，即使在这种情形下，保持中立仍然是目光短浅的，而选择与其中一方结盟，不仅能借助该方的力量摧毁另一方，还因为有你出兵相助，胜利的天平才会倾斜，得胜的一方在战后反而受制于你在关键时刻给予的支持，对你有所顾忌…