《君主论·第二十章·堡垒等手段是否有益》第5节
5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.
注释摘要
马基雅维利在这一节触及了新君主统治中一个极具反直觉的政治经验：那些在上台之初备受君主疑忌的人，往往比最初就获得信任的人更加忠诚、更有用。他先用锡耶纳的潘多尔福·佩特鲁奇为例，这位统治者靠那些曾被他猜疑的人来治理国家。随后他立即谨慎地补充，此事无法一概而论，但他愿意提供一个有边界条件的一般性推理。 这个推理的链条很清晰。他指出，那些在君主掌权初期对君主抱有敌…