《君主论·第二十章·堡垒等手段是否有益》第2节
2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.
注释摘要
这一节马基雅维利要论证的是一个看似违背直觉的道理：新君主绝不能解除臣民的武装，相反，应当向臣民分发武器。他的推理链条非常清晰——武装臣民，那些原本不被信任的人会因为受到信任而变得忠诚，原本就忠诚的人则更加稳固，所有持武器的人都成为君主的追随者。当然，并非所有臣民都能被武装起来，但这里的关键在于差异化的待遇本身：被武装的人得到了利益，自然对君主感恩依附；被排…