《君主论·第十二章·军队有多少种·论雇佣军》第2节
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand; and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.
注释摘要
马基雅维利在这一段提出了全书最核心的军事论断：君主用来保卫国家的军队，要么是自己的，要么是雇佣军、援军或混合军，而后两者毫无用处且充满危险。他的论证链条很清晰：把国家建立在雇佣军和援军之上，君主的地位既不稳固也不安全，因为这种军队涣散、野心勃勃、毫无纪律，不忠于人也不敬畏神。和平时期他们劫掠你，战争时期敌人劫掠你。他们替你打仗的唯一动力是微薄的薪饷，这远远…