《君主论·第九章·市民的君主国》第2节
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.
注释摘要
这一段讨论的是市民君主国内部的政治力学，核心问题是：一个依靠他人支持上台的君主，到底应该选择民众还是贵族作为权力根基。马基雅维利的回答非常明确：民众比贵族更可靠，与其讨好贵族，不如争取人民的善意。他的论证不是出于道德偏好，而是从君主保有权力的实际可能性出发，一条一条地展开。 马基雅维利先指出了一个结构性的分歧。在任何一座城市里，民众和贵族的欲望截然相反：民…