《君主论·第三章·混合君主国》第5节
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge. But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
注释摘要
马基雅维利在这一段里做了一个极为冷静的成本收益分析，比较的是两种稳住新征服领地的手段：往那里派殖民者，还是在那里驻扎一支庞大的军队。他的结论很明确——殖民地远比驻军有用。理由不是道德的，而是纯粹从君主的角度来计算代价、仇恨和风险。 先看他的推理链条。如果你往新领地的一两个要地派遣殖民者，等于用极低的成本安插了替你看门的钥匙。这些殖民者不需要你花费多少，他们…