《论自由·第五章·应用》第15节
I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination. The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds. The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.
注释摘要
这段论述处于《论自由》终章的收束部分，密尔在此做了一个重要的概念清理。全书的论证核心是那条著名的伤害原则，即只有为了防止对他人的伤害，社会才能正当地干涉个人自由。但密尔意识到，在实际讨论政府职能的边界时，有一大类问题并不落在这条原则的管辖范围之内。他在这里要处理的问题是：政府是否可以为了帮助个人而替他们做事，而不是为了制止伤害而限制他们。这两者的区别在于，…