《论自由·第五章·应用》第5节
The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkenness, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labour, if no other means are available.
注释摘要
这一段落在《论自由》的论证链条中处于一个非常关键的位置。密尔在这里处理的是他整个学说中一个棘手的边界问题：即社会为自我防卫而采取预防性措施的权力，如何与他反复强调的“纯粹关涉自身的行为不应受干涉”这一根本原则相协调。他试图为这一原则划定明确的外部限制，而论证的核心工具是一种经过精心设计的归谬法与具体案例的推演。 密尔的论证步骤是这样的。他首先确立一个前提：…