《论自由·第五章·应用》第2节
In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no rights, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit--namely, fraud or treachery, and force.
注释摘要
你现在读到的这段文字，处在整部《论自由》论证链条的最后关口。密尔在前面四章已经建立起了整套学说的两根支柱：第一，个人在只关乎自己的事情上，对社会不负有责任；第二，个人在损害他人利益的事情上，要向社会负责，并可能受到法律或社会舆论的惩罚。现在他进入第五章，也就是“应用”的部分。他的目的并不是要用这两个原则去穷尽所有的具体问题，而是拿出一些典型情境，做出示范性…