《论自由·第四章·社会凌驾个人之权力的限度》第12节
The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.
注释摘要
这段文字处于第四章论证的一个关键转折点上。密尔在之前的篇幅里，已经建立了社会权力与个人自由之间的界限，并特别澄清，即便在那些只关涉个人自身的行为领域，旁人仍然可以劝告、疏远、甚至以自然的方式表达反感，但不能诉诸法律惩罚或有组织的道德强制。他的对手当然会反驳说：所谓纯属个人自身的行为其实根本不存在；个人的恶习会通过同情、依赖、示范等渠道，波及家庭与社会。密尔…