《论自由·第四章·社会凌驾个人之权力的限度》第8节
And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavour to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.
注释摘要
这一段是密尔在第四章中替他的论敌设下的一个强有力的诘问。在论证链条中，密尔刚刚划定了社会权威与个人自由之间的那条核心界线——凡行为只关切自身的利害，不对他人构成明确伤害或妨碍既定社会义务时，个人就该拥有完全的自由。然而，一个敏锐的反对者会在这里立刻发起挑战，而密尔正是要把这个挑战完整、诚实地摆出来。这段文字就是那个挑战本身，是密尔以论敌的口吻提出的假想反驳…